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JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES,
AND THE WARREN COURT*
NORMAN DORSEN** -

Justice Harlan was an indispensable component of the Warren Court.
This is true not only, as a wiseacre might say, because losers are needed

if there are to be winners, but because he provided a form of resistance
to the dominant motifs of the Court that was intelligent, determined,
professionally skillful, and, above all, principled. In a sense he defined the
Court by his dissents. For this performance over sixteen years Harlan

received extraordinary praise. Earl Warren himself said that "Justice
Harlan will always be remembered as a true scholar, a talented lawyer, a
generous human being, and a beloved colleague by all who were
privileged to sit with him."' Judge Henry Friendly, who first worked

with Harlan as a young lawyer in the early 1930s, boldly asserted that
"there has never been a Justice of the Supreme Court who has so

consistently maintained a high quality of performance or, despite
differences in views, has enjoyed such nearly uniform respect from his
colleagues, the inferior bench, the bar, and the academy."' There are

many similar accolades. 3

* Presented at the New York Law School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice
John Marshall Harlan (Apr. 20, 1991). A shorter version of this article has been published
in the Journal of Supreme Court History: 1991 Yearbook of the Supreme Court Historical
Society. See Norman Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan and the Warren Court, 1991 J. SUP.

CT. HIST. 50.
** Stokes Professor of Law and Co-director of the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil
Liberties Program, New York University Law School; President, American Civil Liberties
Union, 1976-1991; law clerk to Justice Harlan, 1957-1958.
I am grateful to two former fellows in the Hays Program, Andrew Dwyer '90 for a
valuable analysis of Justice Harlan's opinions and Michael Rothenberg '91 for research
assistance, and to the Filomen D'Agostino Greenberg and Max E. Greenberg Faculty
Research Fund at the New York University School of Law for financial support.
1. Earl Warren, Mr. Justice Harlan,As Seen by a Colleague, 85 HARV. L. REV. 369,
370-71 (1971).
2. Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Harlan, As Seen by a Friend and Judge of an
Inferior Court, 85 HARV. L. REV. 382, 384 (1971).
3. See, e.g., Paul A. Freund, Foreword to THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL
PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE JOHN M. HARLAN xiii (David
L. Shapiro ed., 1969); Nathan Lewin, Justice Harlan: "The Full Measure of the Man", 58
A.B.A. J. 579 (1972); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Address at the 63rd Annual Meeting of the
American Law Institute (May 15, 1986), reprinted in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PROCEEDINGS: 63RD ANNUAL MEETING 312 (1987); Charles Alan Wright, Hugo L. Black.
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In this paper I shall indicate the nature and extent of Harlan's views
as a counterpoint to the civil liberties rulings of the Warren Court
majority. But I shall also suggest that it would be a mistake to conceive
of Harlan solely in this light, as an inveterate reactionary seeking to
forestall the brave new world that his brethren sought to welcome or even
to create. To a surprising degree, Harlan concurred in the liberal activism
of the Warren Court, picking his spots carefilly and above all seeking
(though not always successfully) to be true to his core values of federalism
and a limited judicial function. What emerges, in sum, is not a right-wing
Justice, as he is sometimes conceived, but rather someone closer to the
center, a moderate figure avoiding the extremes.
I.
The subject of this paper is Justice Harlan and civil liberties, but it is
palpably not possible to isolate Harlan's views on liberty from his overall
judicial philosophy. In particular, it is necessary, if one is to understand
Harlan fully, to take account of two overarching themes in his
jurisprudence: federalism and proceduralism. Other articles in this
symposium concentrate on these topics, 4 so for present purposes we need
discss them only briefly to appreciate their relevance to his civil liberties
opinions.
Harlan was preoccupied with the necessity of keeping "'the delicate
balance of federal-state relations' in good working order." 5 Harlan's
view of federalism is perhaps best summarized in an opinion by Justice
Field, which Harlan quoted approvingly: "[T] he Constitution of the United
States . . . recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of
the States . . . . Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial
A Great Man and a Great American, 50 TEx. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1971). The first full
biography of Justice Harlan has recently appeared. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN
MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WARREN COURT (1992).

4. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Justice Harlan's Legal Process, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 155 (1991); David L. Shapiro, Justice Harlan and Justiciability: Notes on Two
Dissents, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 199 (1991); Nadine Strossen, Justice Harlan and the
Bill of Rights: A Model for How a Classic Conservative Court Would Enforce the Bill of
Rights, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (1991); Donald H. Zeigler, Justice Harlan and
Implied Rights ofAction, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 205 (1991); Lori G. Wentworth, Note,
Justice Harlan, Justice Rehnquist, and the Values of Federalism, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
255 (1991).'
5. John M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in
Balance, 49 A.B.A. J. 943, 944 (1963); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Judicial self-restraint... will be achieved ... only
by.. . wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation
of powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms.").
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action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the
6
Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States."
Harlan's narrow conception of the state action doctrine is traceable in
large part to federalist concerns. In his view, expansion of the area of
federal court authority over activities that are properly the responsibility
of state government simultaneously impairs "independence in their
legislative and independence in their judicial departments." 7 Thus, for
example, despite his strong commitment to racial equality, Harlan did not
believe that land bequeathed in trust to a Georgia city as a "park and
pleasure ground" for white people was unconstitutionally administered
because a state court replaced public trustees with private ones and the
park was municipally maintained." Nor did he believe that a state
constitutional amendment, adopted by referendum, that protected the right
of private parties to exercise total rights over real property, including the
ability to discriminate on the ground of race, was invalid because the state
was thereby encouraging the discrimination.' And in a nonracial context,
Harlan dissented from a holding that a privately owned shopping mall was
the equivalent of a company town and was thus barred from prohibiting
peaceful picketing of a supermarket in the mall.' °
It is of special importance to note that Harlan saw federalism not only
as part of our constitutional design," "born of the necessity of achieving
union," but as "a bulwark of freedom as well."12
We are accustomed to speak of the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment as the principal guarantees of personal
liberty. Yet it would surely be shallow not to recognize that the
6. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, I., dissenting),
quoted in Pay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 466 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Henry

v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 464-65 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing the
majority's disrespect for state procedures as the very "antithesis" of federalism); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's entry
into political matters); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 39 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Court's interference with state matters was not justified under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
7. Fay, 372 U.S. at 466 (Harlan, I., dissenting) (quotihg Baltimore & O.R.R., 149
U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting)).
8. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 315 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 387 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 333 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 409 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("mhe
American federal system is itself constitutionally ordained ... .
12. Harlan, supra note 5, at 943.
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structure of our political system accounts no less for the free
society we have. Indeed, it was upon the structure of government
that the founders primarily focused in writing the Constitution.
Out of bitter experience they were suspicious of every form of
all-powerful central authority and they sought to assure that such
a government would never exist in this country by structuring the
federal establishment so as to diffuse power between the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. 3
Thus, because Harlan "believe[d] that among the constitutional values
which contribute to the preservation of our free society, none ranks higher
than the principles of federalism," he viewed the "Court's responsibility
for keeping such principles intact [as] no less than its responsibility for
maintaining particular constitutional rights." 4
In addition to historical justifications and its "significance as an
instrument of freedom," 5 Harlan viewed federalism as essential for
preserving the values of pluralism and local experimentation. No other
political system "could have afforded so much scope to the varied interests
and aspirations of a dynamic people representing such divergencies of
ethnic and cultural backgrounds," and still "unif[y] them into a nation." 6
In Roth v. United States,'7 addressing the power of the states and the
federal government to regulate obscenity, Harlan said:
[O]ne of the great strengths of our federal system is that we have,
in the forty-eight States, forty-eight experimental social
laboratories. "State statutory law reflects predominantly this
capacity of a legislature to introduce novel techniques of social
control. The federal system has the immense advantage of
13. Id. at 943-44.
14. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 57 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). A similar
point was made by Justice Lewis Powell:
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal overreaching under the
Commerce Clause is not simply a matter of dollars and cents. Nor is it a matter
of the wisdom or folly of certain policy choices. Rather, by usurping functions
traditionally performed by the States, federal overreaching under the Commerce
Clause undermines the constitutionally mandated balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government, a balance designed to protect our
fundamental liberties.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
15. Harlan, supra note 5, at 944.
16. Id.
17. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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providing

forty-eight

separate

centers

for

such

experimentation.""
Harlan's dedication to proceduralism was equally firm and closely
related to his views on federalism. "Proceduralism" refers not only to

rules that govern trials and appeals, although these are included, but also
to issues of justiciability-such as standing, ripeness, abstention, and

comity-that determine when the judicial power will be exercised and thus
relate more broadly to the role of courts, especially the Supreme Court,

in American society.
Dissenting from the Supreme Court's "one person, one vote" decision
in Reynolds v. Sims, 9 Harlan rejected the view
that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some
constitutional "principle," and that this Court should "take the

lead" in promoting reform when other branches of government
fail to act. The Constitution is not a panacea for every blot on the

public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial body,
be thought of as a general haven for reform movements.'
Such a view, Harlan argued, "is not only inconsistent with the

principles of American democratic society but ultimately threatens the
integrity of the judicial system itself." 2' Thus, Harlan urged the Court
to steer clear of "political thickets,"' lest "the vitality of our political
system, on which in the last analysis all else depends, is weakened by

reliance on the judiciary for political reform; in time a complacent body
politic may result."'
18. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Henry
M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 493
(1954)).
19. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20. Id. at 624-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting), where Harlan stated that the Court's decision
reflects to an unusual degree the current notion that this Court possesses a
peculiar wisdom all its own whose capacity to lead this Nation out of its present
troubles is contained only by the limits of judicial ingenuity in contriving new
constitutional principles to meet each problem as it arises.
Id. at 677.
21. Harlan, supra note 5, at 943.
22. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 170 (1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.);
Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 63 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
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Harlan went beyond articulating a vague notion of "judicial restraint,"
and embodied his view of the limited role of the courts in a series of
rules.
First, Harlan advanced principles which limited the occasions for

exercising judicial authority. He jealously guarded the Supreme Court's
appellate authority, which he believed should be used" "for the settlement

of [issues] of importance to the public," and "should not be exercised
simply 'for the benefit of the particular litigants.'" '
Thus, Harlan
urged strict adherence to the doctrines of standing and abstention.'
He repeatedly called upon the Court to follow a number of practices
designed to avoid unnecessary or premature judicial intervention, including

allowing administrative processes to run their course,' not passing on
the validity of state statutes which have neither been enforced nor
interpreted by state courts, 28 not addressing issues not considered

("mhe fact that the coup de grace has been administered by this Court instead of being
left to the ...political process should be a matter of continuing concern to all interested
in maintaining the proper role of this tribunal under our scheme of government.") (footnote
omitted).
24. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 250 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955)).
Thus, Harlan had more than one occasion to remind his brethren that the Court was not
akin to a state court of appeals designed to correct lower court error or assure justice for
every litigant. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 119 (1967) (Harlan, J.,dissenting);
see also United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 90 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Court should narrowly construe a statute creating a right of direct appeal).
25. See, e.g., Jenldns v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 433 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Court for turning the principle of standing "on its head, as it
attempts to create a controversy out of a complaint which alleges none"); Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 130 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (opposing taxpayer standing in
Establishment Clause challenges because "unrestricted public actions might well alter the
allocation of authority among the three branches of the Federal Government").
26. See, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959) (stating that "the
federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to
interpretation until the state courts have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass
upon them" in order to avoid "unnecessary interference by the federal courts with proper
and validly administered state concerns").
27. See, e.g., Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 45, 47 (1956)
(Harlan J., dissenting) (stating that the administrative order interpreted by the majority
should not have been subjected to judicial scrutiny until all administrative procedures had
been exhausted). But cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967)
(holding that access to the courts under a regulation must be permitted "[w]here the legal
issue presented is fit for judicial resolution, and where a regulation requires an immediate
and significant change in the plaintiffs' conduct of their affairs with serious penalties
attached to noncompliance").
28. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 92 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)

1991]

HARLAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND TBE WARREN COURT

below," and refusing to hear appeals of nonfinal orders. 3° Harlan
insisted that the Court avoid "'constitutional decisions until the issues are
presented with clarity, precision and certainty,' and [should] refuse to
decide . . constitutional question[s] in the abstract." 31 Harlan also was
steadfast in his view that an adequate and independent state law ground
barred Supreme Court review of state court decisions, a "rule of
constitutional dimensions going to the heart of the division of judicial
powers in a federal system."'32
("Mhe Court ordinarily awaits a state court's construction before adjudicating the validity
of a state statute."); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, I.,
dissenting) (the "statute thus pro tanto goes to its doom without either state or federal court
interpretation, and despite the room which the statute clearly leaves for a narrowing
constitutional construction").
29. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676-77 (1961) (Harlan, I., dissenting)
(deciding issues not fully considered below "is not likely to promote respect either for the
Court's adjudicatory process or for the stability of its decisions"); NLRB v. Lion Oil Co.,
352 U.S. 282, 304-05 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(deciding issues not considered below "depriv[es] this Court... of the considered views
of the lower courts" and "represents unsound judicial administration"). But cf. Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("While ordinarily I would not
deem it appropriate to deal... with constitutional issues which the Court [and the court
below] ha[ve] not reached, I shall do so here because such issues ... are entangled with
the Court's conclusion .... ").
30. See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("In deciding this case on the merits, the Court, in my opinion,
disregards the express limitation on our appellate jurisdiction to '[flinal judgments or
decrec ' . . . .") (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988)); Mercantile
Nat'1 Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 572 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the state court determination related only to venue and was thus "not in itself
reviewable as a final judgment"); Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518 (1956)
("[R]eview must await the conclusion of the 'whole matter litigated' ..... ").
31. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 32-33 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (quoting Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 576
(1946)); see also Burton v. Wilmington Paridng Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 730 (1961) (Harlan,
I., dissenting) ("[S]ound principles of constitutional adjudication dictate that we should first
ascertain the exact basis of this state judgment .... ."). But cf Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 114-15 (1968) (Harlan, I., concurring) (although the issues were presented to the
Court in an "opaque" opinion, "the constitutional claims having been properly raised and
necessarily decided below, resolution of the matter by us can not properly be avoided").
32. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 464 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 466
("[D]etermination of the adequacy and independence of the state ground . . . marks the
constitutional limit of our power in this sphere."); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
46-7 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Mhe Court's assumption of what amounts to a
general supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues in state courts . .
. is wholly out of keeping with our federal system.. . ."); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S.
443, 457 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I cannot account for the remand of this case in
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Second, Harlan urged the Court to show deference to other decisionmaking authorities. In addressing whether a federal prisoner was entitled
to a hearing on a second motion for relief from sentence under the federal
habeas corpus statute, Harlan maintained that
[r]ules respecting matters daily arising in the federal courts are
ultimately likely to find more solid formulation if left to focused
adjudication on a case-by-case basis, or to the normal rule-making
processes of the Judicial Conference, rather than to ex cathedra
pronouncements
by this Court, which is remote from the
33

arena.

And, perhaps growing out of an attitude of "subservience to the facts" '
that he developed as a trial lawyer, Harlan believed strongly in deference
to the fact-finding of the trial courts, saying that "appellate courts have no
facilities for the examination of witnesses; nor in the nature of things can
they have
that intimate knowledge of the evidence and 'feel' of the trial
35
scene."

Finally, Harlan was committed to the stable and predictable
development of the law. He protested when the Court resolved important
issues by way of summary disposition. For example, in the Pentagon
Papers case,' Harlan recounted the "frenzied train of events" whereby,
within one week from the date of decisions rendered by two courts of
appeals, the Court heard argument and issued a decision. 37 Harlan

the face of what is a demonstrably adequate state procedural ground .... ").
33. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 32 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366, 377 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(concluding that when complex technical matters are involved, "the informed expertise of
[an administrative agency] is a necessary adjunct to satisfactory judicial resolution of
particular cases"); Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 300 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that decisions which concern the procedures governing in forma
pauperis appeals are "best left to the discrete treatment by the Judicial Councils in the
various Circuits").
34. John E.F. Wood, John M. Harlan,As Seen by a Colleague in the Practiceof Law,
85 HARV. L. REV. 377, 379-80 (1971).
35. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 23 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see
also Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 294 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (the Court
should not be the "ultimate arbiter of factual disputes" in libel cases); Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 100 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (the Court "should be extremely slow to upset
a state court's inferential finding" with respect to disputed questions of fact); United States
v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U.S. 233, 243 (1957) (the truth or falsity of testimony and
affidavits "is a matter for the District Court to determine").
36. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
37. Id. at 753 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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identified a number of pertinent issues (including some unfavorable to the

government's position),38 and noted that the "time which has been
available to us, to the lower courts, and to the parties has been wholly
inadequate39 for giving these cases the kind of consideration they
deserve. "
The pervasive effect of Harlan's commitment to federalism and
proceduralism will be evident throughout our discussion of his civil

liberties rulings.'
II.
We may now look more closely at Harlan's dissents from the principal
civil liberty themes of the Warren Court. Perhaps the most central of these
is "equality," an idea that "[o]nce loosed . . . is not easily cabined." 41
Harlan vigorously opposed egalitarian rulings of many kinds. He was most

vehement in condemning the reapportionment decisions, first in Baker v.

Carr,42 in which the Court acknowledged federal jurisdiction to decide

the issue whether state legislative districts were malapportioned, then in
Reynolds v. Sims,' in which the Court established the one person-one

vote rule, and in the many sequels to these rulings.' Harlan never
became reconciled to what he regarded as a wholly unjustified
encroachment into the political realm, saying in Reynolds that "[ilt is
difficult to imagine a more intolerable and inappropriate interference by

the judiciary with the independent legislatures of the States.""
38. See id. at 753-55. For example, Harlan raised the question of whether the Attorney
General was authorized to bring the suits against the newspapers in the name of the United
States. See id. at 753-54.
39. Id. at 755 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 15
(1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[W]ithout briefs and oral argument by the parties on the
merits of the question, I would refrain from choosing between the conflicting constructions
...pressed upon the Court by the parties."); Travia v. Lomenzo, 381 U.S. 431, 434-35
(1965) (Harlan, I., dissenting) (opposing the Court's denial of a stay and motion to
accelerate an appeal, stating that "these matters bristle with difficult and important
questions").
40. For Harlan's views on stare decisis, also important to these themes, see infra notes
149-61 and accompanying text.
41. ARCHBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT 6 (1968).
42. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
43. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
44. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 59 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 488 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
45. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 615 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Closely related to the reapportionment cases are those dealing with the
right to vote. Here, too, Harlan dissented, from the ruling that invalidated
Virginia's poll tax,' from a decision that opened school board elections
to a man who was neither a parent or a property-holder in the district,47

and from the decision upholding Congress's power to extend the franchise
to eighteen year olds.
The poll tax case illustrates an aspect of the Court's egalitarianism to
which Harlan especially objected: its acceptance of the idea that
government has an obligation to eliminate economic inequalities as a way
to permit everyone to exercise human rights. The leading case in this

regard was Griffin v. Illinois,49 in which a sharply divided bench held
that where a stenographic trial transcript is needed for appellate review,

a state violates the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to provide the
transcript to an impoverished defendant who alleges reversible errors in

his trial. Harlan's dissent maintained that "[a]ll that Illinois has done is to
fail to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic circumstances

that exist wholly apart from any state action."' He later dissented in
Douglas v. California," where the Court held that a state could not deny
counsel to a convicted indigent who seeks the only appeal he has by right
to a higher court.
Another example of this genre is Harlan's protests at efforts to
transform welfare payments into an entitlement. Harlan maintained that
states could deny such payments to otherwise eligible welfare applicants,
who had not resided in the state for a year or more.52

Harlan also found himself out of step with the prevailing view on

criminal procedure, where the Warren Court rewrote the book, 53
46. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
47. See Kramer v. Union Free Scfiool Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 634 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
joined by Black and Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
48. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
49. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
50. Id. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. 372 U.S. 353, 360 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
53. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have again rewritten the book on criminal
procedure, adopting positions that in general would have been congenial to Justice Harlan.
See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546
(1991); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); see also HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE BURGER
YEARS 143-88 (1987) (discussing the Burger Court's decisions in the area of criminal
justice). There is no attempt in this article to trace doctrinal development in this and other
subjects on which Justice Harlan wrote.
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transforming the law relating to confessions and line-ups, the privilege
against self-incrimination,

wiretapping and eavesdropping,

and the

admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, among other aspects of
criminal cases. The linch-pin of most of these rulings was the doctrine of

selective incorporation, by which the protections of the first eight
amendments to the Constitution that were deemed "fundamental" were

applied by the Court to state criminal trials under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.' Rejecting Harlan's view that the
Due Process Clause established a general test of "fundamental fairness"
not tied to the particular provisions of the Bill of Rights, the Court

completed a massive reform of criminal procedure in an astonishingly

brief period of time.55 Harlan vigorously dissented from most of the key
decisions, including those applying the exclusionary rule to illegally seized
57
evidence,' incorporating the privilege against self-incrimination,

creating the Miranda rules for warning individuals being taken into police
custody, 58 and establishing the requirement of a jury trial in criminal

cases. 59 He equally opposed the Court's conclusion that the guarantees

of the Bill of Rights that were "selectively" incorporated should apply to

the states in exactly the way in which they applied to the federal
government.'

In these cases he asserted that a healthy federalism was

inconsistent with the assertion of national judicial power.61

Harlan also objected in the interests of federalism to extensions of

congressional power. The two most significant cases of this sort were

54. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
55. See generally YALE KAMIsAR, POICE INTERROGATON AND CONFESSIONS (1980)
(discussing the five year period in the niid-1960s when the Court's rulings in constitutional
criminal procedure cases imposed new restrictions on law enforcement's use of
interrogation practices in eliciting criminal confessions).
56. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
57. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
58. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 801 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(double jeopardy); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(confrontation); Malloy, 378 U.S. at 14 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (self-incrimination); see
also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 117-18 (1970) (Harlan, I., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), where Harlan noted in a separate opinion that the necessary consequence
under the incorporation doctrine of the holding that a twelve person jury is not required in
state criminal trials is, through a "backlash," the application of the same lesser standard
in federal cases.
61. See, e.g., Benton, 395 U.S. at 801 (Harlan, J.,'dissenting); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Katzenbach v. Morgan62 and United States v. Guest,' in which the
Court adopted broad theories in sustaining, respectively, the authority of
Congress to invalidate state English language literacy tests for voting as
applied to individuals who completed sixth grade in Puerto Rican schools
and to punish private action that interferes with constitutional rights.
At the same time Harlan, often contrary to the majority, deferred to
congressional judgments that resulted in an impairment of civil liberties.
For example, he conceded broad authority to Congress over citizenship,
rejecting any constitutional right to prevent involuntary
denationalization, 4 he protested a softening of the immigration law that
provided for deportation of an alien who had ever been a member of the
Communist Party, however nominally,' and he opposed a constitutional
right to travel abroad, first recognized in Kent v. Dulles' and solidified
in Aptheker v. Secretary of State.67 In all these cases he refused to
overturn actions of the elected branches of government that resulted in
severe and arguably unjustified harm to individuals.
There is no doubt, in light of these cases and others, that Justice
Harlan was a regular and frequent dissenter from some of the Warren
Court's key liberal decisions. In addition, especially in his early Terms,
there were many important cases in which Harlan was part of a majority
that rejected constitutional theories supported by the liberal Justices. For
example, he wrote the prevailing opinions in cases rejecting First
Amendment claims by individuals who were held in contempt by the
House UnAmerican Activities Committee and were denied admission to
the practice of law for refusing to respond to questions concerning
Communist activities,' and by a man sentenced to prison because of his
membership in the Communist Party.' These cases have not been
overruled, but later decisions have overturned majority opinions which
Harlan joined that, for example, permitted states to question criminal
62. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
63. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
64. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) J-Harlan, J., dissenting); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 114 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., joined by Burger, Clark, and Harlan, JJ.,
dissenting); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
65. See Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115, 121 (1957) (Harlan, I., dissenting).
66. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
67. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
68. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109 (1959).
69. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). Another particularly harsh
decision in this area was Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), in which Harlan,
writing for the Court, upheld the denial of social security benefits to an alien who was
deported because he had been a member of the Communist Party many years before.
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suspects without regard to the privilege against self-incrimination, 70 and
that denied women the right to serve on juries equally with men. 7' These

cases must also be counted among those in which Harlan was out of step
with the liberal activism that characterized the Warren Court.'

III.
But this is far from the whole story. Justice Potter Stewart, one of
Harlan's closest colleagues, recognized this when he said: "I can assure
you that a very interesting law review article could someday be written on
'The Liberal Opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan.'"' In virtually every area

of the Court's work, there are cases in which Harlan was part of the
consensus and, indeed, in which he spoke for the Court.
Harlan joined Brown I 74 and Cooper v. Aaron,'7 decisions

instrumental in protecting the principle of the initial school desegregation

case, Brown L76 He also joined every opinion decided while he was on

the Court that applied Brown to other sorts of state-enforced

segregation. 77
He concurred in Gideon v. Wainwright,75 the case granting a right
to counsel to accused felons, and wrote the opinion of the Court in Boddie
v. Connecticut,79 which held that a state could not deny a divorce to a
couple because they lacked the means to pay the judicial filing fee.
70. See Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964).
71. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975).
72. For discussion of these themes, see Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); J.Harvie Wilkinson III, Justice John Marshall Harlan and
the Values of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REV. 1185 (1971).
73. See John Marshall Harlan, 1899-1971, Memorial Addresses Delivered at a Special
Meeting of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Mr. Justice Potter
Stewart, Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, and Professor Paul Bator (Apr. 5,
1972).
74. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
75. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
76. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
77. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(public accommodations); Griffim v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (public
schools); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (public schools); Watson v. City
of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (recreational facilities); Peterson v. City of Greenville,
373 U.S. 244 (1963) (public accommodations).
78. 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Harlan, J.,concurring).
79. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REViEW

[Vol. 36

Although both these cases were decided under the Due Process Clause,
they amounted, at bottom, to judicially mandated equalization of economic
circumstance in situations where Harlan concluded that it would be
fundamentally unfair to deny poor people what others could afford.
In the criminal procedure area, while opposing the exclusionary rule

in state prosecutions, he consistently supported a strong version of the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
by federal authorities,' including application of the principle to
wiretapping and eavesdropping. 8 He also wrote separately in support of

a ruling that extended criminal due process protections to juveniles
accused of delinquency.' And he wrote an opinion overruling earlier
cases upholding the federal registration requirements for gamblers,
concluding that they could avoid prosecution for violation of the statutes
by pleading the privilege against self-incrimination. I
Turning to free expression, one finds a host of important cases in
which Harlan supported that constitutional right. For example, he wrote
the important opinion in NAACP v. Alabama," which held that it was a

form of freedom of association protected by the First Amendment for
individuals to join civil rights groups anonymously when exposure would
have entailed great personal risks. He joined New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,s which first imposed limits on libel judgments against the

media, and some (though not all) of the sequels to that case. 6 He joined
opinions that barred states from refusing to seat an elected legislator

80. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) (no probable cause to
search); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (defective arrest warrant).
81. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
But c. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 89 (1967) (Harlan J., dissenting) (opposing
application of exclusionary rule where state engaged in electronic eavesdropping).
82. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 65 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
83. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (overruling Lewis v. United
States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955), and United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953)).
84. 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (invalidating a Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting the circulation
of anonymous handbills as a violation of free speech and association).
85. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (holding that sufficient
evidence is required to show that defendant had serious doubts as to the truth of the alleged
defamatory statement to invoke actual malice standard); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64 (1964) (holding that the New York 7imes case limits state power to impose sanctions for
criticism of public officials in criminal cases as well as civil cases). Cf Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 96 (1966) (Harlan, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
an impersonal attack on government operations will not constitute defamation unless it is
specifically directed at plaintiff).
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because of his sharply critical views on the Vietnam War," and from
convicting a leader of the Ku Klux Klan for "seditious" speech.88 And
he wrote for the Court to protect the right of a black man, unnerved by
the shooting of a civil rights leader, to express himself strongly about the
country while burning the flag."
Harlan also wrote a number of opinions, all curbing variants of
McCarthyism, that nominally were decided on nonconstitutional grounds
but rested on First Amendment principles. In the first of these, Cole v.
Young,' which invalidated the discharge of a federal food and drug
inspector, Harlan interpreted a statute authorizing dismissals of
government employees "in the interests of national security"91 to apply
only to jobs directly concerned with internal subversion and foreign
aggression. The next year, in what Anthony Lewis has described as a
"masterfully subtle opinion,"' Harlan construed the Smith Act? to
permit prosecution of Communist Party leaders only for speech amounting
to incitement to action rather than for "abstract doctrine" advocating
overthrow. 9' A third instance involved companion cases in which the
government had revoked the naturalization of two persons who were
asserted to have obtained their citizenship improperly.95 The government
contended that they were Communists and therefore not "attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States" as required by the
applicable statute.' Harlan's opinion found that "clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence"' was lacking that the individuals were aware,
during the relevant period prior to their becoming citizens, that the
Communist Party was engaged in illegal advocacy. During the 1950s these
decisions were milestones in lifting the yoke of political repression.
87. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
88. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
-89. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
90. 351 U.S. 536 (1956); see also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (holding
a security discharge invalid because an agency failed to follow prescribed procedures);
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (same).
91. Cole, 351 U.S. at 551.
92. Anthony Lewis, Earl Warren, in THE WARREN COURT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 1,

15 (Richard H. Sayler et al. eds., 1968).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1988).
94. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318-27 (1957).
95. See Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S. 670 (1958); Nowak v. United States,
356 U.S. 660 (1958).
96. Nowak, 356 U.S. at 662 (quoting the Nationality Act of 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34
Stat. 596, 598, repealed by Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, § 504, 54 Stat. 1172).
97. Id. at 663 (quoting Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943)).
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Freedom of religion also showed Harlan as frequently, but not
invariably, protective of constitutional guarantees. He joined decisions that
prohibited organized prayer in the public schools,9" and that invalidated

a requirement that state officials declare a belief in God.' And while
approving state loans of textbooks to church schools,"° he balked when
tax-raised funds were used to reimburse parochial schools for teachers'
salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials. 1"' Similarly, while
unwilling to grant constitutional protection to adherents to Sabbatarian
faiths who objected to Sunday closing laws and to unemployment
compensation laws that required a willingness of the applicant to work on
Saturdays," ° Harlan wrote a powerful opinion during the Vietnam War
declaring that a statute that limited conscientious objection to those who
believed in a theistic religion "offended the Establishment Clause" because
it "accords a preference to the 'religious' [and] disadvantages adherents
of religions that do not worship a Supreme Being." "0
In all of these cases, Harlan emphasized that "[t]he attitude of
government towards religion must... be one of neutrality.""° Harlan
was sophisticated enough to appreciate that neutrality is "a coat of many
colors." "° Nevertheless, as Professor Kent Greenawalt has observed,
"no modem justice ha[s] striven harder or more successfully than Justice
Harlan to perform his responsibilities in [a neutral] manner.
A final area of civil liberties, sexual privacy, is of particular
importance because Harlan produced the most influential opinions on this
subject written by anyone during his tenure on the Court. In the first case,
a thin majority, led by Justice Frankfurter, refused to adjudicate, on the
ground that there was no threat of prosecution, the merits of a Connecticut
law that criminalized the sale of contraceptives to married and unmarried
people alikeY Harlan's emotional opinion°s---a rarity for him-not
only differed with this conclusion but extensively defended the proposition
98. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel
v.Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
99. See Toreaso v. Watldns, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
100. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
101. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
102. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 418 (1963) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
103. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357 (1970) (Harlan, J.,concurring).
104. Allen, 392 U.S. at 249.
105. Id.
106. Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 982, 984 (1978).
107. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
108. See id. at 522 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
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that Connecticut's law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a position that prevailed four years later in Griswold v.
Connecticut."° It is impossible to know whether Harlan would have
extended this reasoning to support the result in Eisenstadt v. Baird,110
which held that a state could not punish the distribution of contraceptives
to unmarried persons, or to Roe v. Wade's"' recognition of abortion as
a personal right, both decided soon after he retired. But I am confident
that, at a minimum, he would have protected the right of a married
woman to proceed with an abortion that was dictated by family
considerations.
Harlan's participation in the major thrusts of the Warren Court was
not confined to civil liberties and civil rights. In economic cases, too, he
often went along with the majority's support of government regulation of
business, despite the fact that his private practice of law often involved the
defense of antitrust and other actions involving the government, and he
was acutely aware of the effect of regulation on business. To be sure, he
frequently voted to limit the impact of regulatory statutes,"' but there
are also many important antitrust cases in which he sided with the
government or private plaintiff. 3
IV.
The Warren Court ended in mid-1969, but Harlan remained for two
more Terms, a brief period in which he was the leader of the Court.
Possessing seniority and an unmatched professional reputation, he took
advantage of the replacement of Earl Warren and Abe Fortas by Warren
Burger and Harry Blackmun to regain the position of dominance that
Justice Frankfurter and he shared until Frankfurter retired in August,
1962. Thus, as Chief Judge Friendly noted, against Harlan's average of
62.6 dissenting votes per Term in the period between 1963 and 1967, he
cast only 24 such votes in the 1969 Term and 18 in the 1970 Term." 4
109. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also id. at 499 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
110. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
111. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967) (Harlan,
I., concurring); United States v. Contiiental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 467 (1964) (Harlan,
I., dissenting).
113. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 581 (Harlan, J. concurring); White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 357 (1962) (Harlan, I., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 214 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring).
114. Friendly, supra note 2, at 388.
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This new situation meant that Harlan could reassert conservative
themes in his own opinions or join such expressions in the opinions of
others. For example, during this period he adhered to his longstanding
opposition to expansion of the constitutional rights of poor people to
public assistance by voting with the majority in the leading case rejecting
welfare as an entitlement. 15
Similarly, he prevailed in a series of criminal justice decisions,
including those that confined the reach of the Confrontation Clause, denied
a jury trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings and permitted the closing
of such hearings to the public, and authorized capital sentencing without
guidelines." 6 And in an important case that involved both the rights of
poor people and procedural due process, Harlan joined Justice Blackmun's
opinion rejecting Fourth Amendment claims and sustaining the power of
caseworkers to make unannounced visits to the homes of welfare recipients
117
to check their eligibility and to provide rehabilitative assistance.
In the First Amendment area Harlan also maintained longstanding
positions, but here he was more often in dissent. The most notable
occasion was the Pentagon Papers case,"' where he would have
permitted the prior restraint of newspaper publication of an extensive and
politically embarrassing history of the Vietnam War. He also dissented in
an important libel case" 9 and in two decisions confining the authority of
bar examiners to probe into the associations of applicants.2' But he
prevailed in another bar admission case, recalling issues from earlier days,
that sustained questions about Communist associations,121 and he again
joined the majority in an obscenity prosecution that rejected privacy as
well as free speech claims."
With regard to the breadth of the judicial role, he maintained his
opposition to expansion of the state action doctrine, even when the
115. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
116. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 557 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
117. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
118. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
119. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 62 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
120. See In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 34 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Baird v. State
Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
121. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971). Harlan consistently upheld regulation of the bar in the face of claims under the First
Amendment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 448 (1963) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
122. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 357 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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consequence was to limit racial equality." He took a similar position
when he joined a majority opinion rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment
claim against an amendment to a state constitution that provided for a
community referendum before a low-rent housing project could be
constructed or acquired."x
While Harlan was fortifying his formidable conservative record under
Chief Justice Burger, he nevertheless adhered to a balanced judicial profile
by supporting some of the Court's liberal activist rulings. Thus, in the
equality area, he maintained his support for desegregation, " and he
joined the new Chief Justice's opinion expanding remedies against
discriminatory employment tests. " And as noted above, his opinion in
Boddie," which invalidated a state statute that denied poor couples the
right to a divorce because they could not afford court filing fees, came
during this period. Harlan's reliance on the Due Process Clause to reach
this result was criticized," and the doctrine has not survived, but the
case stands as a rare example of Harlan's reaching out to right an
economic imbalance that prejudiced poor people in American society. 29
In another such case involving criminal justice, Harlan joined the Court's
opinion prohibiting the incarceration of indigents who were unable to pay
criminal fines. 1" He continued his deep concern for Fourth Amendment
123. See Palmerv. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). But c. Adickes v. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144 (1970) (holding that a state-enforced custom compelling segregation in
restaurants is sufficient state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes).
124. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
125. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 144; Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232
(1970).
126. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
127. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); see supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 3, 104-13 (1971)
(arguing that Harlan was mistaken in his view that the rationale for procedural due process
was that commencement of a lawsuit effectively forecloses the opportunity for extra-judicial
settlement and that the actual rationale for procedural due process springs from the Court's
power to settle conclusively legal relations by final judgment). But see LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONS1TTUTIONAL LAW 1462-63, 163940 (2d ed. 1988) (citing with
approval Harlan's belief that constitutional protection for the poor rests better in the Due
Process Clause because it contains a "natural limiting principle" and arguing that the Court
has not subsequently drawn valid distinctions between the application of the Due Process
Clause to a divorce case as opposed to bankruptcy, contract oi "any case").
129. For another example, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), in which
Harlan joined Justice Brennan's path-breaking opinion granting welfare recipients pretermination procedural rights.
130. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S.
395, 401 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (joining majority's holding for reasons set forth
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rights,"' and he wrote an extensive concurring opinion in support of
"beyond reasonable doubt" as the proper standard of proof in juvenile
delinquency hearings." And in the First Amendment field he wrote a
widely cited opinion that protected display in a state courthouse of a
"scurrilous epithet" ("fuck the draft") in protest against conscription.1 3
V.
What should one conclude from the many decisions in which Justice
Harlan, a conservative, supported constitutional rights, often in highly
controversial cases in which the Court was split? That he was in step with
the majority of the Warren Court? Plainly not. There rare too many
instances where he marched separately. That he was essentially a civil
libertarian? No again. Not only are there too many cases to the contrary,
but at a basic level that is not the way Harlan reacted to injustice. This is
not to say that he was insensitive to human suffering or unmoved by
evidence of arbitrariness. It is rather that something else was at the core.
In my opinion, that something was. Harlan's deep, almost visceral,
desire to keep things in balance, to resist excess in any direction. Many
times during my year with him he said how important it was "to keep
things on an even keel." To me, that is the master key to Harlan and his
jurisprudence. One recalls Castle, the hero of Graham Greene's novel The
Human Factor, as he muses on those who are "unable to love success or
power or great beauty."" Castle concluded that it is not because these
people feel unworthy or are "more at home with failure."13 It is rather
that "one wanted the right balane."" In reflecting on some of his own
perplexing and self-destructive actions, Castle decided that "he was there
in Williams).
131.

See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971)

(Harlan, J.,

concurring).
132. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
133. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 22 (1971). This is the leading opinion of
the Court recognizing "the communicative power of speech's emotive content." Kenneth

L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of
Groups, 1990 ILL. L. REV. 95, 101; see also Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public
Discourse: An Essay on ProfessorBickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance

of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283 (contrasting Harlan's Cohen opinion with
Professor Bickel's belief that obscenities erode social values and create "pollution of our
common moral environment").
134.

GRAHAM GREENE, THE HUMAN FACTOR 148 (Vintage ed. 1978).

135. Id. at 149.
136. Id.

1991]

HARL4N, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND T=E WARREN COURT

to right the balance. That was all." 137 Harlan was not a man who
avoided success or power or, if one knew Mrs. Harlan, great beauty, but
nevertheless in his own eyes he was there to right the balance. It is
significant that he entitled a major speech at the American Bar Association
Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the JudicialFunction in Balance. 3 s
There is evidence of balance not only in the decisions discussed above
but in his elaborate views on doctrines of justiciability. These are closely
related to his frequent preoccupation with judicial modesty or, put
negatively, his opposition to excessive judicial activism, which in turn is
related to the central theme of his judicial universe--federalism. As I
suggested in 1969, "[h]is pervasive concern has been over a judiciary that
will arrogate power not rightfully belonging to it and impose its views of
government from a remote tower, thereby enervating the initiative and
independence at the grass roots that are essential to a thriving
democracy." 139
Harlan's thinking on jurisdictional issues was also related to his long
years as a practicing lawyer where he customarily represented defendants
in litigation. In that role he had to be "constantly aware that it is easier
and quicker to achieve victory on grounds such as want of federal
jurisdiction, lack of standing or ripeness, or failure to join an
indispensable party, than to prevail on the merits of a lawsuit."140 That
this earlier sensitivity to issues of justiciability carried over to his judicial
years is seen in the many instances where14Harlan urged jurisdictional rules
to avoid decision of controversial cases. '
On the other hand, reflecting his balanced approach, Harlan wrote or
joined many opinions that expanded the Court's jurisdiction. Perhaps the
most notable was Poe v. Ullman, 42 where he vigorously rejected, in
dissent, Justice Frankfurter's reasoning in dismissing an early challenge
to Connecticut's birth control law on the ground that the statute was not
being enforced. Again, in NAACP v. Alabama, 4 3 the first case explicitly
recognizing a freedom of association, his opinion for the Court proceeded
to its First Amendment conclusion only after overcoming difficult
procedural obstacles involving the doctrines of standing and independent
137. Id.
138. See Harlan, supra note 5.
139. Norman Dorsen, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan:A Constitutional Conservative,
44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 249, 271 (1969).
140. Id. at 254.
141. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
142. 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
143. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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and adequate state grounds. And in the first school-prayer case, 1'" and
again in the ruling that ordered the House of Representatives to seat Adam
Clayton Powell,14 both cases of unusual sensitivity, Harlan joined
majority opinions that rejected substantial justiciability defenses. 1"
Harlan's often unappreciated willingness to expand judicial authority
can be seen in several cases involving the broadening of remedies in civil
rights and economic cases alike. In one case, again differing with
Frankfurter, he wrote to sanction the expansion of federal remedies against
municipal officials who violated an individual's civil rights. 4 7 In a
second ruling, involving a provision of the Securities and Exchange Act
that prohibited false and misleading proxy statements in respect to
mergers, Harlan agreed that a stockholder could sue for rescission and
was silent on whether private lawsuits
damages even though the statute
14
could be used to enforce it. 8
Stare decisis is another area relating to legal process and the judge's
role in which Harlan sometimes manifested an activist spirit. He
recognized that the doctrine "provides the stability and predictability
required for the ordering of human affairs over the course of time and a
basis of 'public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and
reasoned judgments.' "149 And while the principle should not be
"[w]oodenly applied" and "[n]o precedent is sacrosanct,"
[s]urely if the principle of stare decisis means anything in the
law, it means that precedent should not be jettisoned when the
rule of yesterday remains viable, creates no injustice, and can
reasonably be said to be no less sound than the rule sponsored by
those who seek change, let alone incapable of being demonstrated
wrong. 15D
144. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
145. See Powell v. MeCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
146. For another Harlan opinion that adopted a broad view of standing, see Parmelee
Transp. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
147. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
148. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
149. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 127 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403
(1970)).
150. Id. at 128-29; see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for overruling a case which it had upheld for nearly ten
years "by a remarkable process of circumlocution"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that "justice might well have been done in this case
without overturning a decision on which the administration of criminal law in many of the
States has long justifiably relied").
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There are therefore many instances where Harlan vigorously protested the
overruling of precedent. 15'
Like other Justices, Harlan would often follow a case from which he
had dissented when it was initially decided. 5 What is striking is that he
followed this principle even as it carried him to dissent from the Court's
failure to follow precedent with which Harlan disagreed. Thus, in Green
v. United States, 53 the Court held that where a defendant is convicted
of a lesser included offense and then secures a reversal of the conviction,
the defendant may be retried only for the lesser included offense.
Although Harlan dissented in Green, he dissented again in North Carolina
v. Pearce," where he found, contrary to the Court, that Green
mandated the conclusion that a defendant once "convicted and sentenced
to a particular punishment may not on retrial be placed again in jeopardy
of receiving a greater punishment than was first imposed."'"5
But there are also many contrary instances which betoken Harlan's
flexibility. Thus, Harlan wrote separately in the Gideon case to give Betts
v. Brady" "a more respectful burial than has been accorded" by the
Court. 57 Harlan reasoned that the Brady rule, by which indigent
defendants were afforded appointed counsel only in "'special
circumstances,' ... has continued to exist in form while its substance has
been substantially and steadily eroded. . . . To continue a rule which is
honored by this Court only with lip service is not a healthy thing and in
the long run will do disservice to the federal system." 1 ' In Marchetti
v. United States 59 he spoke for the Court in overruling a decision that
151. See, e.g., Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268 (Harlan J., dissenting) (opposing the
overruling of Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672

(1961) (Harlan J., dissenting) (opposing the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949)). See generally Dorsen, supra note 139, at 257 (discussing factors in Harlan's
background and character which may have produced his profound respect for precedent).
152. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403.U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (following Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961)); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(following Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73,
98 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring) (following Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
153. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
154. 395 U.S. 711,744 (1969) (Harlan, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. Id. at 751; see also Usnerv. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 503-04
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that an earlier case from which he dissented should
be controlling).

156.
157.
158.
159.

316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 350-51.
390 U.S. 39 (1968).
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denied the privilege against self-incrimination to gamblers prosecuted for

failing to register and pay taxes. In Moragne v. States Marine Line,
Inc., in a celebrated opinion, he overruled a case that "rested on a
most dubious foundation when announced, has become an increasingly
unjustifiable anomaly as the law over the years has left it behind, and..

* has produced litigation-spawning confusion in an area that should be

easily susceptible of more workable solutions.""'

Finally, one may point to cases in which Harlan exhibited a trait

familiar to all of his law clerks-his exceptional open-mindedness and
willingness to listen to new arguments. In these cases he dissented from
the Court's refusal to hear oral argument on constitutional claims,

although in each of them he was not predisposed to agree on the merits of
the appeal. Thus, he joined Justice Douglas's dissent from the refusal to

hear a plea of the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade that the

organization was improperly ordered to register as a Communist front
organization under the Subversive Activities Control Act.162 Similarly,
despite his earlier Barenblatt ruling upholding the authority of the House

UnAmerican Activities Committee to probe political associations,163 he
would have heard a challenge to contempt citations issued by the

Committee against an uncooperative witness." And in perhaps the most
far-reaching action, he would have set down for oral argument a complaint
by Massachusetts that raised the issue of the legality of the Vietnam
War," although he ordinarily accorded great deference to decisions of

the elected branches of government on matters of war and peace. 16

160. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
161. Id. at 404. Other cases in which Harlan was willing to overrule obsolete
precedents, with "particularly acute analyses," William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. L.J. 1361, 1390 (1988), include Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395
U.S. 653 (1969), and Walker v. Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196, 199 (1966) (Harlan, J.
dissenting).
162. See Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 380 U.S. 513, 514 (1965) (Douglas, J., joined by Black and Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
163. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
164. See Stamler v. Willis, 393 U.S. 217 (1968); see also Wiseman v. Massachusetts,
398 U.S. 960, 960 (1970) (Harlan, J.,dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari) (urging
review of a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court enjoining distribution of the film
71tticut Follies, a documentary about life at the Bridgewater State Hospital for the
criminally insane).
165. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970).
166. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
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VI.
The pattern of decisions provides ample proof that Harlan was not a
one-dimensional Justice. What is less clear is the source of his drive to
keep things in balance, to eschew an extreme ideology.
Two possibilities may be suggested. The first is the familiar notion
that in any society, patricians (like Harlan) are concerned less with results
in particular controversies, and certainly less about pressing any group
against the wall, than with assuring the smooth functioning of institutions
without the precipitation of volatility or deep-seated enmities. This means
that dissent should be allowed an outlet, that minorities should be able to
hope, that political power should not become centralized and therefore
dangerous. Thus, his decisions supporting desegregation, a strong federal
presence, and law and order. Thus also his fears about court-dominated
legislative reapportionment and about the "incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment that enhanced judicial authority
and represented too dramatic a break with established doctrine. But thus
also Harlan's willingness to take reformist steps, to overrule outdated
precedent selectively and before a problem worsened, and above all to
listen closely to many voices.
These traits are consistent with Harlan's warm embrace of federalism
principles. It should be recalled that the idea of federalism is, itself, a kind
of balance-a way of dividing governmental authority to prevent a tooeasy dominance of public life by a single institution or faction. The
FederalistPapers are explicit in extolling, as a "guard against dangerous
encroachments" the division of power "between two distinct governnients"
so that the "different governments will control each other."167 Years
ago I reflected on whether the national government or the states and local
governments are the securer bulwark of-or the greater threat to-civil
liberty.
Local units are closer to the people but offer more opportunity for
undetected discrimination and repression. The national
government acts more visibly and with more formal regard for
minority interests, but its vast power is a civil liberties time bomb
that in this century has brought us the Palmer Raids,
McCarthyism, and Watergate. 1"
167. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322, 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the manner in

which state governments would protect their citizens against encroachments by the national
government, and vice-versa).
168. Nornan Dorsen, Preface to THE FUTURE OF OUR LiBERTiEs ix, xi (Stephen C.'
Halpern ed., 1982); cf Norman Dorsen, Separation of Powers and Federalism, 41 ALB.
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Whatever the proper resolution of this question, it is clear that Justice
Harlan believed, as much as he believed in any principle, that federalism
was "a bulwark of freedom."16
A second source of Harlan's overall philosophy is legal process
theory, which had its heyday during almost exactly the period that he
served on the Supreme Court. In the early 1950s, Henry Hart produced
a draft of the work that he and Albert Sacks published at Harvard Law
School in a "tentative edition" in 1958 (it was also the final edition).17
The moderate philosophy embodied in these materials was tailor-made to
Harlan's personality. It emphasized the central role that procedure plays
in assuring judicial and legislative objectivity17 ' and the corollary
"principle of institutional settlement, " which holds that judgments
properly arrived atby institutions operating within their appropriate sphere
of authority should be accepted as binding on the entire society until duly
changed.
Not surprisingly, Harlan was attracted to this theory, which enabled
him to take constitutional steps' as long as they were not too long or
jarring, while simultaneously offering him ample institutional reasons for
resisting excessive judicial authority. This approach was often enlisted in
opinions that were inhospitable to civil liberties, but Harlan's reliance on
legal process also led him at times to activist results, whether through the
protection of individual rights or the overruling of outmoded precedent.
By 1971, when Harlan left the Supreme Court, legal process theory,
buffeted by events in society at large, was beginning to lose its hold, even
at Harvard, and the more extreme philosophies of law and economics and
critical legal studies moved to the forefront. 74 The struggle within the
Court became ever more polarized as in succeeding years strong civil
L. REV. 53, 69 (1977) (proposing that local government units have historically been less
responsive to minority concerns within their jurisdictions and that progress for minorities
has come at the hands of the federal government).
169. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
170. see HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPULCATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 1958).
171. See id. at 715-16.
172. Id. at 4-5.
173. The Hart & Sacks materials did not address constitutional problems, and it is
doubtful whether the authors intended their work to apply to such issues. See Norman
Dorsen, In Memoriam: Albert M. Sacks, 105 HARV. L. REV. 11, 13 n.12 (1991).
Nevertheless, many judges and scholars have applied legal process themes to constitutional
cases. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
174. For a recent and provocative discussion of the evolution of legal process and its
successor theories, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991).
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libertarians, which Harlan was not, waged battle with doctrinaire
conservatives, which Harlan also was not.
It fell to John Marshall Harlan, by nature a patrician traditionalist, to
serve on a Supreme Court which, for most of his years, was rapidly
revising and liberalizing constitutional law. In these circumstances, it is
not surprising that Harlan would protest the direction of the Court and the
speed with which it was traveling. He did this in a remarkably forceful
and principled manner, thereby providing balance to the institution and the
law it generated. Despite this role, Harlan joined civil liberties rulings on
the Court during his tenure to the degree that his overall jurisprudence can
fairly be characterized as conservative primarily in the sense that it
evinced caution, a fear of centralized authority, and a respect for process.

